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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

CHRIS DEAN BENDER,

Case No. 15413

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the appellant, CHRIS
DEAN BENDER, was charged with the crime of Theft in the Third Degree
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-403 (1953 as
amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury on March 3, 1977, before the
Honorable James S. Sawaya, and found guilty of Theft in the Third
Degree.

Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term as provided

by law and placed on probation.

As terms of that probation, the

appellant is required to reside at the Community Correction Center
(Halfway House) until released by that facility.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third Jud·ic1al
· Dt.
Court for a new trial, or in the alternative, the appellant seek;
reversal of the judgment rendered below and a remand of the case
the Third Judicial District Court with the instructions to enter
judgment for the lesser included offense of Attempted Theft and,
impose the appropriate modifications in the sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Francis Hayes, an employee of Chalk Garden, a woman's
clothing store located in Salt Lake City, testified that on Decec:

21, 1976, she had just arrived at work when she first noticed

t) 0

appellant in one of the Chalk Garden's dressing rooms (T. 3). At
time, according to Ms. Hayes, the appellant "
thing in a big paper bag" (T. 5, line 7).

. . was putting :

On cross-examination,

clarified that the article, a coat, was actually halfway in and r
out of the bag when she observed the appellant (T. 13).

Ms. Hay<

had noticed the appellant because the dressing room door was oper.
usually it is kept closed (T. 7).

In fact, she testified that if

door had been closed, she would have not been suspicious (T. 10).
After contacting John Bernard, the owner and manager o'.
Chalk Garden, concerning the appellant, Ms. Hayes returned to th<
dressing room and found a wooden hanger, normally used for the
·
·
(T . 7) .
expensive
mere h an d ise

me

However, she did not check for po:

removed price tags in the room nor did she check the rack where'
coat had been located for additional hangers (T. 15).

There was

evidence presented which specifically connected the hanger with'.
coat.

.d
t know wr
Additionally, Ms. Hayes testified that she d 1 no

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

the coat had been previous to her observation, what had previously
been in the dressing room, nor when the appellant had arrived at the
store (T. 9, T. 13).
John Bernard, upon being contacted by Ms. Hayes, followed
the appellant from the dressing room to the front counter and register
area.

Mr. Bernard testified:
. . . there were a couple of sales people behind the
counter and more than one person at the counter
purchasing something at the time. He [the appellant]
stopped and spoke with someone at the counter . . .
I could not hear what they were saying. I have no
idea what was mentioned. They did speak to each
other, and then he turned and walked down here past
the end of the counter the end of this counter,
towards the front door. At this point I asked him if
I could see what he had in the paper sack (T. 20,
lines 1 - 3, 8 - 12). . . . There was no disagreement in any way (T. 21).

Mr. Bernard then opened
(T. 22).

the sack, a ZCMI bag, and removed the coat

He identified the coat as belonging to the Chalk Garden.
On cross-examination, Mr. Bernard admitted that the

"conversation" he said the appellant engaged in at the counter only
amounted to his hearing the appellant say something to someone without
hearing or knowing whether any reply was made (T. 29).
Mr. Bernard stated that he stopped the appellant ten

Additionally,
to twelve feet

from the exit while still near the counter area (T. 34).
Mr. Bender, the appellant, took the stand in his own behalf,
and testified that he had been resting on a bench in the Chalk Garden
when he noticed an unknown woman leave the ZCMI bag in the dressing
room (T. 53 - 54).

He opened the sack, partially took out the coat,

replaced it, and proceeded to the counter area (T. 54 - 55).

At the

counter, he attempted to inform a person he thought was an employee
about the coat.

No response was made (T. 55).

Mr. Bender was then

the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The State witnesses agreed that at all times the a
PPe
was cooperative, never attempting to leave the store when stoppe·
nor hostile in giving the bag to Mr. Bernard for inspection (T.

34).
The only major factual dispute in the evidence presen:
concerned statements which Mr. Bernard alleged the appellant maai
him at the time the appellant was detained (T. 22 - 23).
denied these statements (T. 56).

The ai:

Mr. Bernard admitted that heh:

concluded the appellant was guilty of theft at the time of the st
and that no statements or explanations of the appellant would ha.
made a difference to him (T. 45).
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION ON
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED
THEFT.
Appellant was entitled to an instruction on Attemptea
Theft as a lesser included offense to the charge of Theft.

Af~

trial, the appellant requested the instruction on the lesser inc'.
offense 1 and made a timely exception to its exclusion (T. 67),

1.

The appellant's requested instruction stated:
In the event that you have a reasonable doubt as to.r
Bender's guilt as to the crime of theft, you may then con~ 1 f;
whether or not Mr. Bender is guilty of attempted theft, ed
you would be warranted in convicting Mr. Bender of attemlrw'
theft, the State must prove each and every one of the fo 0 •
essential elements of that crime:
1
1. That on or about December 21 1976 the said CHR1:
DEAN BENDER did attempt to obtain or ex~rcise 'unauthorized c.
over the property of the Chalk Garden.
. ~
2. That he attempted to obtain the property with
purpose
deprive
the
said
Chalk
o~ Services
said prop~rH)o
Sponsored by the S.J.to
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The importance of instructions on the lesser included
offenses was noted in State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130
(1937).

The Court stated that the trial court's failure to instruct

on lesser offenses "
trial in criminal cases:

. clashes with two fundamental rules of
It has the effect of the court weighing

the evidence and, in effect, limiting the jury to a consideration
of only part of the evidence

... '

and it, in effect, casts upon

the defendant the burden of proving his innocence or justification."
Id. at 1132.
'

Utah Code Annotated §77-33-6 (1953 as amended) imposes
the obligation to give the instruction on the lesser included offense,
providing:
The jury may find the defendant guilty of any
offense the commission of which is necessarily
included in that with which he is charged in
the indictment or information, or of any attempt
to comm.it the offense.
This section recently was interpreted by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Pierre, Supreme Court No. 13903, November 25, 1977,
where the Court held the statute was subject to the modification of

less than $1,000.00 lawful money of the United States.
4. That such acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
Mr. Bender's plea of not guilty thereby casts upon the
State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and
all of the foregoing essential elements. Thus, before you can
convict Mr. Bender of the crime of attempted theft, you must
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable do~bt, each and
every one of the foregoing elements. If iyou find that the .
evidence has failed to prove any one or more of these essential
elements to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then
it is your duty to acquit Mr. Bender.

- 5 -
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..
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-402 (4) (1953 as amended), Whi
states:
~he co~rt

shall not be o~ligated to charge the
Jury with respect to an included offense unless
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquittin
the defendant of the offense charged and convictig
him of the excluded offense.
ng
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (1976), the Utahi
Court defined the situations where instructions on lesser includ,
offenses are requested and when such instructions must be given,
matter of law.

Citing Lisby v. State, 414 P.2d 592 (Nev., 1966),

Court stated:
First, where there is evidence which would absolve
the defendant from guilt of a greater offense, or
degree; the instruction is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not support
a finding of guilt in the commission of the lesser
offense or degree. For example, the defendant
denies any complicity in the crime charged, and thus
lays no foundation for an intermediate verdict;
or where the elements of the offenses differ, and
some element essential to the lesser offense is
either not proved or shown not to exist. This
second situation renders an instruction on a lesser
included offense erroneous, because it is not
pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where
the elements of the greater offense include all
the elements of the lesser offense; because, by
its very nature, the greater offense could not
have been committed without defendant having the
intent in doing the acts, which constitute th7
lesser offense. In such a situation instructions
on the lesser offense may be given, because all
elements of the lesser offense have been proved.
However, such an instruction may properly be
refused if the prosecution has met its burden of
proof on the greater offense, and there is no
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense.
The court concluded by stating that if there be
any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable
theory of the case under which the defendant
might be convicted of a lesser included offens7,
the court must, if requested, give an appropriate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered
by the Utah
Library.
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The question is whether there is a rational basis upon
which a lesser included offense could have been submitted to the
jury.

In the instant case, John Bernard testified that he stopped

the appellant while the appellant was in the store (T.21) and that
the appellant offered no resistance to Mr. Bernard's inquiries
and requests (T.33-34).

Further, the appellant voluntarily waited

for Mr. Bernard when Bernard left the store to locate a security
guard.

Because the appellant never left the store with the

merchandise, appellant believes the case at bar is within the
first situation discussed by the Court in Dougherty, supra, and
therefore, entitled him to the instruction on the lesser offense
as a matter of law.

Appellant submits that the second Dougherty

situation is inapplicable notwithstanding his denial of complicity
in the crime of theft because appellant admitted his presence in
the store and his possession of the package.

The second Dougherty

situation is most reasonably read as encompassing those situations
wherein a defendant denies his presence at the scene of the crime
or presents an alibi defense.

Where the evidence of appellant's

conduct could be interpreted as exonerating him of the crime of
theft, there is a rational basis for instructing the jury on the
lesser included offense of attempted theft.

Alternatively, ·appellant's

case falls within the intermediate situation of Dougherty and the
State failed to meet its burden of proof, entitling the appellant
to his requested instruction.

Both the appellant's testimony

concerning his possession of the package and the evidence that he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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never left the store with the merchandise would tend to reduce
the greater offense of theft.
Appellant submits that the instant case is soundly
within the purview of Sections 77-33-6 and 76-1-402(4) as
interpreted by the Court and that it was prejudicial error to 0~:
the instruction to the jury on the lesser included offense.

The

effect of the Court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense was to contravene the jury's duty to consider
other verdicts which they might deem more appropriate in the cin
stances.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS
At the trial, the appellant submitted a proposed jury
2
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis.
The trial
court refused to so instruct the jury and the appellant made a
timely exception to the exclusion (T.67).
2.

The appellant's proposed instruction stated:

To warrant you in convicting the defendant ?f the cf~l
charged in the complaint, the evidence must, to your minds ex~ t
every reasonable hypothesis other than. the gu~lt of. the defen a~r
that is to say, if after a full and fair consideration an? co~~
of all the testimony in the case you can reasor,ably explain \
facts in evidence on any other reasonable ground other than t e
guilt of Mr. Bender, then you must acquit him.

-8-
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The policy behind the reasonable alternative instruction
to protect the rights of the accused and to emphasize to the jury
that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, based on
the evidence presented, that the defendant is guilty of the offense
charged was stated by the Court in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67,
355 P.2d 57 (1960).

In Garcia and more recently in State v. Fort,

Supreme Court No. 15197, December 22, 1977, the Court has held
this instruction proper only in cases where a necessary element
of guilt consists of circumstantial evidence.

See also State v.

Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1976).
The appellant testified at the trial that.he observed a
woman leave a package in the dressing room when she left the room
while he was sitting on a bench in the store (T.53-54).

He went

to the dressing room to retrieve the package and proceeded to the
front of the store to stop the woman or turn in the package at the
time he was stopped by the manager (T.54-55).

The prosecution's

evidence substantiates the appellant's version of his actions.
The salesgirl testified to observing the appellant in the dressing
room when she first came on duty (T.6).

Mr. Bernard testified

to following the appellant to the front of the store and seeing him
speaking to someone at the checkout counter (T.19-20).
At no time did Mr. Bernard nor the security officer attempt to
elicit an explanation from the appellant.
Because the State presented no evidence which overtly
reflected on the appellant's intent, the evidence is subject to
alternative conclusions, one resulting in a finding of innocence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

and the other i·n gui"lt.

In thi·s c·ircums t ance, an

·
instruction

or reasonable alternative hypothesis which accentuates the State
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is appropriate and
necessary to insure the appellant's right to justice and fairnesi
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF THEFT
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Implicit in the State's burden of proof is the requirement to pre
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the intent to
take the owner's property and deprive him of it.

State v. Kazda,

545 P.2d 190 (Utah, 1976), State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Ut~.r
In Romero, supra, a prosecution for burglary and theft, the Court
stated, "The culpable mental state required for [theft] is define
as a conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or co.
the result", citing Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (1975 Pocket Suppl&
The Court went on to state:
This Court has long upheld the standard th~t in an
appeal from conviction the court cannot weigh
the evidence nor say what quantum is necessary to
establish. a fact ~eyon~ a reasona~le doubt so long 218
as the evidence given is substantial [554 P.2d at ·
The State's evidence in the instant case fails to meet the substr
level delineated by the Court.
The principal deficiency of the evidence is that the
heC .

salesgirl testified that she had just arrived at the store w ·
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observed the appellant in the dressing room and that no evidence
was presented which proved or even suggested that the appellant
took possession of the coat prior to its placement in the ZCMI
bag.

Additionally, the appellant was stopped by the manager when

he was ten to twelve feet away from the exit and the appellant
offered no resistance to the manager's inquiries.

The evidence

does not suggest that the appellant sought to conceal the package
taken from the dressing room.

In both respects, the case at bar

is distinguishable from the facts in State v. Doherty, 29 Utah 2d
_320, 509 P.2d 351 (1973).

The defendant in Doherty was charged

with stealing a gun from a store and the Court held there was a
sufficient showing of asportation· of the gun without evidence
showing that the defendant carried it beyond the check stand and
from the premises.

However, in that case the defendant was

observed near the gun case; a store employee heard the gun case
open and saw the defendant's companion put a pistol in his pocket
and leave the store; and the defendant removed a pistol from
his pocket and placed it on the counter when approached by a store
employee.
Unlike Doherty, the instant case is lacking in evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to prove the appellant's conscious
objective to cormnit the offense or to prove that he completed the
offense.

The evidence, at best, is sufficient to show the lesser

included offense of attempted theft and fails to prove a prima
facie case of theft.

Consequently, the Court must reverse the

judgment of theft.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court comrni tted prejudicial error in refusi·
to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense and reasona\
alternative hypothesis.

The evidence of both parties presented,

rational basis for the inclusion of the instructions and the
failure to so instruct diminished the normal judicial insurance
that the verdict be based on a finding of proof beyond a reasonai
doubt of the offense charged.

Further, the State failed to pres<

a prima facie case of theft by proof of all of the elements and
the conviction must be reversed for insufficient evidence to
support the verdict.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant ii

entitled to a new trial.

In the alternative, the Court may

remand the case to the District Court with the instruction to ent'
a judgment for the lesser included offense of attempted theft ani
to impose a new sentence thereon.
DATED this

day of January, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINE FITZGERALD
Attorney for Appellant
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